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 SOME EFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES UNDER
DIFFERENT MICROSTRUCTURES
PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
Abstract. We show that the eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes
depends on the market microstructure. Within our model, hetero-
geneous traders use a blend of technical and fundamental trading
strategies to determine their orders. In addition, they may turn
inactive if the proﬁtability of trading decreases. We ﬁnd that in a
continuous double auction market the imposition of a transaction
tax is not likely to stabilize ﬁnancial markets since a reduction in
market liquidity ampliﬁes the average price impact of a given order.
In a dealership market, however, abundant liquidity is provided
by specialists and thus a transaction tax may reduce volatility by
crowding out speculative orders.
1. Introduction
As, for instance, illustrated by [27], ﬁnancial markets are quite volatile
and may display severe bubbles and crashes. Since asset prices are de-
termined by the orders of market participants, one may argue that
speculative activity is at least at some times excessive in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. Keynes [15] and Tobin [32] therefore suggested to introduce a
Transaction Tax (TT) in ﬁnancial markets in order to curb specula-
tive activity. Their basic argument rests on the assumption that there
are two types of market participants: stabilizing long-term investors
and destabilizing short-term speculators. A small transaction tax has
presumably no impact on long-term investors so that their stabilizing
inﬂuence on the market should remain intact. However, even a modest
transaction tax may have a strong impact on the proﬁtability of short-
term speculators. Keynes and Tobin suspect that this trader type is
the main trigger for the recurrent turbulent behaviour of ﬁnancial mar-
kets. If destabilizing short-term speculative orders decrease, ﬁnancial
markets should become more eﬃcient.
The optimistic view of Keynes and Tobin has been supported by
a number of prominent economists, including [29], [30], or [8]. For a
general discussion of this topic see [26], [33] and [28]. But there are
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also opponents to this proposal. For instance, a few empirical papers
conclude that transaction taxes may not contribute to a stabilization of
ﬁnancial markets ([34], [14], [1], [12]). However, one should note that
these empirical studies face some restrictions. For instance, the paper
by Umlauf investigates the case were Sweden introduced a transaction
tax rate of 2 percent and today probably nobody recommends such
a high transaction tax. Further sceptical comments concerning the
empirical research may be found in [35].
Some authors have also tried to address this open research question
from an agent-based ﬁnancial market perspective. According to sur-
vey studies (e.g. [31]), market participants rely on both technical and
fundamental trading rules to determine their orders. Guided by these
observations, models have been developed which explore the impact of
heterogeneous interacting agents upon the market dynamics. This ap-
proach, recently reviewed in [13], [17] and [21], has proven to be quite
successful. For instance, these models are able to replicate some im-
portant stylized facts of ﬁnancial markets such as bubbles and crashes,
excess volatility or fat tails for the distribution of returns and thereby
add to our understanding of the working of ﬁnancial markets. Key
contributions include [5], [16], [3], [6], [20], [2], [9] or [25].
Given the power of these models, it seems natural to use them as
artiﬁcial laboratories to test the eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes. An
early contribution in this direction is [11]. Frankel develops a simple
exchange rate model with two types of agents: Investors believe that
the exchange rate will return towards its fundamental value while spec-
ulators are convinced that the exchange rate will trace out a bubble
path. Frankel analytically shows that an exogenous increase in the frac-
tion of investors leads to a reduction in the variability of the exchange
rate. The opposite is true when the fraction of speculators increases.
According to Frankel, a transaction tax could be expected to lower the
fraction of speculators or to raise the fraction of investors. Either way,
he suspects, the volatility of the exchange rate will decrease.
[36] and [37] develop models in which the agents may endogenously
select between technical or fundamental trading rules. In addition, they
may be inactive. The agents’ choice process depends on the strategies’
past performance. A strategy that did well in the past will be followed
by more agents in the future. These two models predict that the im-
position of a small transaction tax is likely to increase market stability
since it crowds out speculative activity. Only when the tax rate is set
too high, market eﬃciency may decrease.
[7] and [22] claim that transaction taxes may have a negative impact
on market liquidity. This is an important observation since market
liquidity is inversely related to the price responsiveness of a given order
(see [18], [10], [19]). This means that the lower liquidity, the stronger
the price change with respect to a given incoming order. Both papersEFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 3
ﬁnd that if this eﬀect is taken into account the stabilizing impact of a
transaction tax decreases.
The goal of our paper is to systematically reconcile the apparently
contrasting results provided in the aforementioned literature. For this
reason, we develop a model along the lines of [4] by Chiarella and Iori
(CI) in which agents rely on a blend of technical, fundamental and
random trading strategies. However, if past trading generates losses,
a trader may also (temporarily) retreat from the market. The price
adjustment is modelled both in a continuous double auction and in
a dealership environment. Both settings have the potential to gener-
ate reasonable price dynamics. So, our model allows comparing the
implications of transactions taxes within diﬀerent institutional market
settings.
Our simulation experiments reveal that the consequences of transac-
tion taxes depend on the liquidity totally provided. When abundant
exogenous liquidity is provided, the tax is stabilizing, but this result
does not hold in other settings, as in the presence of market protocols
where liquidity is endogenous and ﬂuctuating. Most of the theoretical
work, e.g. [37], is indeed based on a market maker scenario in which
inﬁnite liquidity is provided. On the other hand, most empirical work
collects data from more realistic market structures where liquidity im-
perfections are ampliﬁed by the tax, resulting in little eﬀect or even in
a deterioration of market quality. More subtly, our work suggests that
ﬁner details in the functioning of the market might ultimately decide if
the introduction of a Tobin tax is stabilizing. Levying a transaction fee
is always reducing the volume, this, in turn, is harmful only if liquidity
is aﬀected and this triggers an increment in volatility. However, if mar-
ket makers oﬀer widely liquidity, the tax is eﬀective and does produce
smaller volatility. Surprisingly, the imposition of a transaction tax has
in neither market protocol a clear relation to the distortion, i.e. to the
average absolute deviation between prices and fundamentals.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss how the
market participants determine their orders. Our setup is related to the
one presented by CI, yet we assume in addition that the market entry
decision of the traders is endogenous and depends on proﬁt considera-
tions. In section 3, we introduce the market protocols. Order induced
price adjustments take place either within a continuous double auc-
tion market or within a dealership market. In section 4, we present
our results. The last section concludes and two Appendixes provide
additional information.
2. The model
We consider a market for one risky asset (stock) and cash. We as-
sume that the interest rate r = 0 or, equivalently, that the interest rate
payments are spent elsewhere. The market is populated by N agents,4 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
whose initial endowments are Si0 and Ci0 units of stock and cash, re-
spectively. The holdings of the agents are updated in the obvious way
whenever there is a transaction. They cannot go short or lend/borrow
money. There are multiple trading sessions (days) and every agent is
selected in random order within a single day.
Agents record their trading performance and accordingly switch at
the end of the day to an active or idle state. We denote with Xi(t) ∈
{A,I} the state of i-th agent at time t. Inspired by the work of CI,
each agent at time t, if active, submit an order to the market based on
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t is the closing price in session t. The weights gi
1,gi
2,ni and
the length Li are independently sampled from the respective distribu-
tions only once at the beginning of the simulations and never changed.
Equipped with ri
t+1 the agent can compute expected future price as
ˆ pi
t+1 = pt exp(ri
t+1).
Agents are hence heterogeneous in their own blending of diﬀerent
forecasting methods and in the extent of past close-to-close returns
they take into account. Alternatively, we can interpret their random
component as coming from liquidity shocks with no link to any strategic
trading behaviour.
We assume that the agents can submit a unique limit order for one
unit of the asset per day. A limit order is a couple, quantity-limit price
(qτ,lτ) that is submitted in a randomly selected instant τ of a given
day. Assume that t < τ < t+1. Each active trader is posting an order
(qiτ,liτ), where





is depending on the diﬀerence between the forecast and the last avail-




t+1(1 − κi)c if qiτ > 0;
dˆ pi
t+1(1 + κi)e if qiτ < 0,EFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 5
where κi is an individual aggressiveness parameter, that reduces the
bid when buying and increases the ask when selling. Observe that all
limit prices are integers as required by the trading protocols that will
be described in the sequel.
The active agents that were able to trade one unit during the day at




t − piτ − tax if i-th agent is a buyer;
piτ − pclose
t − tax if i-th agent is a seller.
Then the same agents (that succeeded in trading) adjust an individual
smoothed proﬁt measure as
Ui,t = (1 − η)π(i,t) + ηUi,t−1.
Traders can switch strategy with probability µ at the end of each
day, when the closing price becomes available and evaluation of their






Hence the future state of an agent is given by
Xi(t + 1) =
(
A with probability φi,t;
I with probability 1 − φi,t.
Observe that switching is based on proﬁtability in both states: Ui,t
denotes the gains in the active state while 0 is obviously the gain in
the idle state where no trade can occur. The bigger the gains in the
active state, the bigger is the probability to stay (or switch to) active.
Here b > 0 is a parameter related to the intensity of switching: large
b make the agents insensitive to proﬁts and prone to be idle or active
with equal probability. On the contrary, small b will make them more
likely to switch to the most proﬁtable state at time t + 1.
This model of behaviour is assuming that the imposition of a tax is
pushing people to the idle state by shrinking their gains. This is ob-
viously an over-simpliﬁed mechanism in that agents could, say, incor-
porate the tax losses in their forecasts. However, this straightforward
mechanism is used a number of relevant works , see [2], and is close
to the basic intuition that (too) active agents should move to the idle
state being excessive trading penalized by a TT.
2.1. Timing. It is useful to recap in detail how the model is running.
A typical trading day (t-th day) develops as follows:
(1) At t− the closing price pclose
t−1 of the previous session, the past
returns’ averages rLi and the states of agents are known;6 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
(2) Beginning at time t+, agents trade at random times t < τ <
t + 1, submitting their orders to the market (with no certainty
that they will be executed);
(3) In (t+1)− the closing price pclose
t for day t is known and active-
successful traders hence can compute proﬁts π(i,t) and adjust
their performance measure Ui,t. Notice that if an agent is un-
able to trade, his/her π and U are held unchanged. This is
happening for all idle agents.
(4) The probability φi,t to become active is computed for all agents
that possibly switch to another state to be used starting at time
(t + 1)+.
3. The market protocols
We consider diﬀerent market architectures, namely a Continuous
Double Auction (CDA) and a Dealership (Dea). Both the protocols
have some common features: they are organized in trading sessions
(days) where agents can sequentially (in random order) submit bid
and ask limit orders; at the end of the day every outstanding order is
cleared. Prices and acceptable orders are quoted using a minimum tick
which we assume, without loss of generality, to be 1. Hence, prices are
integers.
3.1. Continuous Double Auction. The CDA is a widespread mar-
ket protocol where agents place orders on separate buying and selling
books. Bids (asks) are kept sorted in decreasing (increasing) order ac-
cording to price-time priority. The biggest outstanding bid is called
the best bid and the smallest outstanding ask is called the best ask. If
a new bid (ask) is not smaller (greater) than the best bid (ask) then
the order is marketable and a transaction takes places at the price on
the book for a unit quantity. If the incoming order is not marketable,
it is inserted in the proper book for future use. Orders are canceled
only when they ﬁnd a counterpart or when the trading session is over.
3.2. Dealership. The Dealership is a market protocol where all trades
are executed by a specialist who posts at any time bids and asks (called
quotes) valid for a unit transaction. When an agent has the chance to
trade, he checks the dealer’s quotes and if one of the two is acceptable
a transaction occurs at the quoted price. If this is not the case, the
agent’s order is “lost” and is not available to other agents. As the
dealer is the counterpart of every trade, his inventory must be kept
under control. We assume that this is done by an automated and
non-strategic rule: whenever a transaction takes place, the dealer is
adjusting both quotes by a random integer δ, increasing the prices if
he just sold or decreasing the quotes if he was a buyer. The oﬀset δ is
given by
δ = bU(1,∆)c,EFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 7
Table 1. Values of the parameters used in the simula-
tion, with short description.
Param. Value Description
pclose
0 1000 Initial price
pf 1000 Constant fund. value
N 1000 Number of agents (base case)
lmax 20 Max length of time-window
σ1 1/250 Sd of individual fund. component
σ2 1.4/250 Sd of ind. chartist component
σn 3/1259 Sd of ind. noisy component
η 0.95 Proﬁt smoothing parameter
µ 0.5 Probability to revise state
b {1,...,10} Switching coeﬃcient
tax {0,1,2,3,4} Tax
Γ 6 Constant spread (Dealership)
∆ - Oﬀset used by the dealer (varies with N)
where U(1,∆) denotes a uniform sample in the interval[1,∆]. Hence
the behaviour of the dealer is completely described by two parameters,
namely the ﬁxed spread Γ between quotes and ∆. The latter value
will be tuned in the sequel to obtain time-series that are somehow
comparable to the ones we got in a CDA.
Observe that in both CDA and Dea the price is not deﬁned due to
the presence of bids and asks. As in standard practice, whenever it is
needed we consider the price to be the mid-point of outstanding quotes
(or best bid, best ask).
4. Results
We consider several computational experiments. Given a market pro-
tocol, each experiment is a batch of 100 simulations (5000 trading days,
discarding the ﬁrst 500 to avoid transient eﬀects), where all parameters
are ﬁxed with the exceptions of b and tax. This is meant to obtain 100
time series of 4500 returns, uniformly sampling b in {1,2,...,10} and
tax in {0,1,2,3,4} in order to have representative data on a variety of
settings with regard to the Tobin tax imposed on agents and on their
proﬁt sensitiveness.
The parameters used in the simulations are provided in Table 1.
The values for the environmental and behavioural parameters are
taken from the aforementioned CI paper in order to obtain realistic se-
ries of returns. Most of the time series we generated show well known
stylized facts like non-normal, fat tailed and non-autocorrelated re-
turns. This is remarkable as the series are obtained with varying levels
of tax and b. More details are provided in Appendix A.8 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
We then consider three important indicators, namely volume, volatil-
ity (standard deviation of log-returns) and distortion with respect to
the fundamental value pf. The eﬀects of the imposition of a speciﬁc
level of a TT can be estimated regressing the dependent variables vol-
ume (volatility, distortion, respectively) against the independent vari-
ables tax and b. In other words, we estimate the models
V olumei = k1 + α taxi + β bi,
V olatilityi = k2 + α taxi + β bi,
Distortioni = k3 + α taxi + β bi,
using the whole sample (1 ≤ i ≤ 100) and the three subsamples for
which bi ∈ {1,2,3}, bi ∈ {4,5,6,7} and bi ∈ {8,9,10} corresponding
to strong, medium, low short-term proﬁt sensitivity, respectively.
It is useful to recall at this point the expected outcomes of a TT.
The advocates of the imposition of a tax claim, with diﬀerentiated
nuances, that this should decrease volatility, presumably deterring the
most speculative traders to take part in the market. A reduction in
volume should be observed together with more informative prices that
might be more tightly linked to the fundamental values due to little
excess volatility.
The following two subsections presents the results in a CDA and in
a Dealership.
4.1. Continuos Double Auction (CDA). Table 2 exhibits the re-
gression results for the volume in a CDA. As revealed in Panel A
(N = 1000 traders), an increase in the transaction tax reduces vol-
ume signiﬁcantly. The reduction in volume is most pronounced when b
is low (-2.31 for b ∈ {1,2,3} versus -0.87 for b ∈ {8,9,10}), a situation
in which traders react quickly to transaction tax triggered changes in
the proﬁtability of their trading options. In addition, we see that vol-
ume increases with b. Hence, if b increases, more traders become active
and thus volume grows. The other panels report ﬁndings for diﬀerent
values of N. In particular, we see that if the number of traders in-
creases, the total volume increases and the impact of transaction taxes
on volume becomes stronger. Only if the number of traders is very low
(N = 250, Panel E), the impact of transaction taxes on volume may
turn insigniﬁcant.
Table 3 shows how the results for the volatility in a CDA against tax
and b, for diﬀerent numbers of agents N and diﬀerent subsamples with
respect to b. The rightmost part of panel A shows that an unit incre-
ment of the TT is decreasing the volatility by 0.02% (2 basis points),
while the marginal eﬀect of b is 0.037%. The decrement due to the tax
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% but not at the 1% conﬁdence level.
More importantly, the magnitude of the decrement is rather small in
relative terms: given a volatility of the order of 100 basis points, aEFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 9
Table 2. Volume in a CDA (units traded). The esti-
mates are relative to diﬀerent numbers of agents N (Pan-
els A to E) and subsamples (low, medium, high, all b’s).
Entries are in boldface (italic) if statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% (5%) conﬁdence level.
Panel A: N = 1000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 5.20 (10.09) 9.24 ( 9.15 ) 14.80(4.08) 8.01 (16.73)
α -2.31 (-15.88) -1.21( -7.50 ) -0.87(-3.85) -1.24( -8.97 )
β 2.82 (12.44) 0.62 ( 3.66 ) -0.16 (-0.42) 0.74 (11.34)
Panel B: N = 2000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 10.73 (10.57) 22.72(15.69) 25.16(6.15) 16.11(17.91)
α -4.64 (-15.65) -2.74(-13.46) -1.51(-6.86) -2.72(-10.95)
β 5.61 (12.76) 0.87 ( 3.29 ) 0.27 (0.60) 1.71 (13.45)
Panel C: N = 4000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 20.95 ( 9.99 ) 39.98(15.54) 35.81(4.49) 32.87(18.12)
α -8.81 (-17.66) -4.95(-14.12) -3.23(-8.21) -5.40(-11.16)
β 11.43 (14.07) 2.89 ( 6.27 ) 2.39 (2.70) 3.60 (14.20)
Panel D: N = 500
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 2.85 ( 5.86 ) 4.21 ( 6.71 ) 7.29 (5.50) 4.08 (13.94)
α -1.24 ( -9.82 ) -0.55( -6.40 ) -0.47(-4.13) -0.67( -8.59 )
β 1.38 ( 6.00 ) 0.33 ( 3.19 ) -0.14 (-0.91) 0.33 ( 8.14 )
Panel E: N = 250
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 1.12 ( 6.48 ) 1.92 ( 4.98 ) 2.60 (2.28) 1.47 (10.77)
α -0.40 ( -9.30 ) -0.12 ( -1.83 ) -0.18 (-2.67) -0.23( -5.77 )
β 0.48 ( 7.03 ) 0.08 ( 1.21 ) 0.02 (0.18) 0.17 ( 9.16 )
reduction of 2 basis points might be considered negligible. Even in the
most reactive subsample (when 1 ≤ b ≤ 3) of simulations populated by
strongly proﬁt-sensitive traders, the reduction is not exceeding 5 basis
points (Panel A, leftmost part).
The same result is holding in markets with many agents, see Panels
B and C: the tax has a slightly bigger eﬀect and the coeﬃcient is
increasing from -0.020 to about -0.030 on the whole sample. Again,
the leftmost part of the panels show increased eﬃcacy for low b’s but
still the achievable reduction of volatility appears to be rather small
in relative terms. Figure 1 (left panel) depicts how the results (for
N = 2000) are dependent on the values of the parameter b, which is
related to short-term proﬁt sensitivity. In agreement with intuition,
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Figure 1. Volatility in a CDA and in a Dealership with
2000 agents, for b ∈ {1,2,3},{4,5,6,7},{8,9,10} (from
left to right).
Moreover, markets with few agents (Table 3, Panel D and E) are
“thin” and there is little evidence of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects, if
any. Additional comments on the importance of liquidity are deferred
to the following subsection.
Table 4 presents the regression results obtained for the (percent) dis-
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Despite the common claim that a Tobin tax might help in reducing
the distortion, we ﬁnd no support for this eﬀect. Figure 2 (left panel)
depicts the situation in a CDA with N = 1000 agents. It’s clear that
a TT is unable to reduce the distortion and, in some cases, appears to
mildly increase the deviation from the fundamental.
4.2. Dealership. In this section we examine the eﬀect of a TT in
a dealership, according to the same measures (volume, volatility and
distortion) used in a CDA. We keep ﬁxed the behaviour of the traders,
changing the market. The experiment is meant to test weather the
results are stable across diﬀerent microstructures and, in particular, if
the addition of an exogenous liquidity source (the dealer) is altering our
ﬁndings. We keep Γ = 6 (constant bid-ask spread) and vary ∆ = ∆(N)
(variation of quote) depending on the number of agents, in such a
way to get a volatility of the same order of CDA. We stress that this
“calibration” exercise is hard and imperfect as we try to align 100 time-
series (one for each simulation) obtained across diﬀerent parameters
in institutionally diﬀerent markets. By trial and error we get values
for ∆ such that the average volatility in a dealership is similar butEFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 11
Table 3. Volatility in a CDA (%). The estimates are
relative to diﬀerent numbers of agents N (Panels A to
E) and subsamples (low, medium, high, all b’s). Entries
are in boldface (italic) if statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% (5%) conﬁdence level.
Panel A: N = 1000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 1.01 (17.99) 1.29 (17.23) 1.75 ( 5.74 ) 1.20 (37.76)
α -0.049 (-3.08) -0.015(-1.28) -0.034( -1.77 ) -0.020 (-2.18)
β 0.143 ( 5.75 ) 0.025 ( 1.99 ) -0.024( -0.75 ) 0.037( 8.59 )
Panel B: N = 2000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 0.98 (31.52) 1.34 (25.42) 1.54 (12.40) 1.18 (44.12)
α -0.070 (-7.72) -0.027(-3.66) -0.004( -0.63 ) -0.029(-3.95)
β 0.165 (12.21) 0.028( 2.97 ) -0.052(-0.381) 0.046(12.03)
Panel C: N = 4000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 0.91 (29.96) 1.31 (28.13) 1.43 ( 9.60 ) 1.18 (40.39)
α -0.068 (-9.41) -0.014 (-2.17) -0.019( -2.54 ) -0.030(-3.88)
β 0.195 (16.48) 0.031( 3.77 ) 0.013 ( 0.75 ) 0.050(12.25)
Panel D: N = 500
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 1.08 (14.27) 1.27 (11.11) 1.44 ( 6.10 ) 1.25 (30.85)
α -0.043 (-2.20) -0.030(-1.89) -0.018( -0.87 ) -0.026 (-2.38)
β 0.122 ( 3.42 ) 0.027 ( 1.44 ) -0.002( -0.06 ) 0.025( 4.50 )
Panel E: N = 250
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 1.21 (16.42) 1.40 (10.76) 1.88 (4.750) 1.34 (31.12)
α -0.009 (-0.51) 0.004 ( 0.19 ) -0.024( -1.02 ) -0.009(-0.69)
β 0.067 ( 2.31 ) -0.010(-0.45) -0.053( -1.26 ) 0.003 ( 0.44 )
never exceeding the average value in the “parallel” CDA. It turns out
that this volatility-based calibration also allows to get roughly similar
volumes and distortions in the two markets. Table 5 shows descriptive
statistics of the volatility in the two markets for various sizes of traders’
population.
A look at the table reveals that at least 75% of the simulations (be-
tween the ﬁrst and third quartile) in each panel are close in terms of
volatility. The average standard deviations of returns in a CDA and in
a dealership rarely diﬀer by more than 20 basis points, despite wider
diﬀerences in some extreme occasions. Read with some liberty, Table 512 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
Table 4. Distortion in a CDA (%). The estimates are
relative to diﬀerent numbers of agents N (Panels A to
E) and subsamples (low, medium, high, all b’s). Entries
are in boldface (italic) if statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% (5%) conﬁdence level.
Panel A: N = 1000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 6.10 ( 7.71 ) 5.36 ( 6.75 ) 6.97 ( 2.00 ) 5.70 (17.16)
α 0.260 (1.165) 0.301(2.378) -0.011(-0.050) 0.197(2.050)
b -0.228 (-0.655) 0.019(0.145) -0.085(-0.231) 0.007(0.161)
Panel B: N = 2000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 5.23 ( 9.81 ) 4.53 ( 6.99 ) 5.29 ( 3.17 ) 5.27 (23.62)
α 0.262 (1.680) -0.169(-1.860) -0.022(-0.250) -0.023(-0.376)
b -0.203 (-0.878) 0.238(2.022) 0.048(0.264) 0.052(1.648)
Panel C: N = 4000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 4.18 ( 7.69 ) 4.95 ( 8.51 ) 2.38 ( 1.25 ) 4.72 (22.60)
α 0.019 (0.149) -0.034(-0.435) -0.099(-1.055) -0.032(-0.579)
b 0.247 (1.172) 0.039(0.375) 0.319(1.503) 0.060(2.041)
Panel D: N = 500
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 6.09 (10.15) 6.98 ( 7.39 ) 0.51 ( 0.12 ) 6.38 (15.54)
α 0.721 (4.616) 0.002(0.018) 0.207(0.570) 0.229(2.109)
b -0.241 (-0.849) -0.034(-0.222) 0.715(1.485) 0.023(0.415)
Panel E: N = 250
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 11.56 ( 8.20 ) 9.96 ( 5.95 ) 13.00( 2.80 ) 9.97 (16.27)
α 0.076 (0.215) 0.097(0.344) 0.218(0.780) 0.199(1.132)
b -0.71 ( -1.28 ) -0.34 ( -1.19 ) -0.50 ( -1.00 ) -0.23( -2.83 )
justiﬁes the claim that we can reasonably compare across diﬀerent mar-
kets the eﬀects of the introduction of a TT, given that the simulations
produced are, to the best of our eﬀorts, quite similar
1.
Table 4.2 contains the results of the regression of the volatility in a
dealership against the usual independent variables tax,b and is exactly
homologous with Table 3. The marginal eﬀect of the TT is strongly
statistically signiﬁcant even in thin markets (Panels D and E). Ob-
serve that this holds despite the fact that there is “less to reduce” in
1Observe that we calibrate a single parameter in the dealership, ∆, to “match” a
single average value for the volatility in a CDA. Table 5, however, shows a com-
parison of two distributions of values. Even forgetting the deep diﬀerences between
the two market clearing mechanisms, it’s not surprising that a closer match is hard
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Figure 2. Distortion in a CDA and in a dealership as
functions of tax, given b.
Table 5. Comparison of volatilities (%) obtained in a
CDA and in a Dealership with the same number of agents
N. The parameter ∆ varies to get comparable volatility
with the CDA over the whole sample.
Panel A: N = 1000,∆ = 6
Min. 1Qu. Median Mean 3Qu. Max.
CDA 0.954 1.286 1.384 1.367 1.478 1.694
Dea 0.4782 1.0710 1.1840 1.1720 1.2750 1.8300
Panel B: N = 2000,∆ = 4
Min. 1Qu. Median Mean 3Qu. Max.
CDA 0.8261 1.3400 1.4340 1.3780 1.5000 1.6760
Dea 0.3434 1.0250 1.3090 1.2480 1.5290 2.2630
Panel C: N = 4000,∆ = 2.25
Min. 1Qu. Median Mean 3Qu. Max.
CDA 0.8111 1.3320 1.4380 1.3880 1.5000 1.6370
Dea 0.4153 1.0850 1.2820 1.2400 1.4590 1.9470
Panel D: N = 500,∆ = 11
Min. 1Qu. Median Mean 3Qu. Max.
CDA 0.9784 1.2310 1.3140 1.3360 1.4480 1.9100
Dea 0.4295 1.1190 1.2720 1.2710 1.4270 2.0640
Panel E: N = 2000,∆ = 15
Min. 1Qu. Median Mean 3Qu. Max.
CDA 1.024 1.229 1.347 1.337 1.434 1.925
Dea 0.5837 1.0190 1.1290 1.1380 1.2430 1.829014 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
Table 6. Volatility in a Dealership (%). The estimates
are relative to diﬀerent numbers of agents N (Panels A to
E) and subsamples (low, medium, high, all b’s). Entries
are in boldface (italic) if statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% (5%) conﬁdence level.
Panel A: N = 1000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 0.97 ( 7.79 ) 1.33 (12.88) 1.40 ( 6.73 ) 1.12 ( 25.34 )
α -0.225 ( -6.992 ) -0.063(-3.438) -0.066(-4.516) -0.103(-7.381)
b 0.200 ( 3.082 ) -0.003(-0.129) -0.003(-0.131) 0.040( 6.502 )
Panel B: N = 2000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 0.74 ( 12.87 ) 1.20 ( 7.34 ) 1.30 ( 3.73 ) 1.06 ( 18.42 )
α -0.198 (-14.383) -0.146(-6.219) -0.065(-2.962) -0.149(-9.394)
b 0.283 (13.397) 0.086(3.007) 0.036 (0.945) 0.094(12.138)
Panel C: N = 4000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 0.61 ( 6.61 ) 1.13 (12.58) 1.52 ( 6.47 ) 1.01 ( 23.36 )
α -0.17 ( -9.10 ) -0.15 (-11.92) -0.13 ( -8.22 ) -0.15 (-13.14)
b 0.269 ( 6.196 ) 0.085(5.322) 0.019 (0.719) 0.091(14.644)
Panel D: N = 500
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 1.21 ( 12.37 ) 1.27 ( 8.61 ) 0.58 ( 1.40 ) 1.36 ( 28.50 )
α -0.164 ( -7.551 ) -0.080(-3.881) -0.089(-3.848) -0.109(-7.891)
b 0.129 ( 3.081 ) 0.043 (1.558) 0.098 (2.179) 0.024( 3.606 )
Panel E: N = 250
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k2 1.35 ( 11.58 ) 0.96 ( 9.38 ) 0.67 ( 2.47 ) 1.21 ( 26.63 )
α -0.199 ( -5.748 ) -0.072(-5.004) -0.003(-0.164) -0.069(-5.174)
b 0.065 ( 1.271 ) 0.053(2.955) 0.054 (1.867) 0.012 ( 1.843 )
a dealership whose (average) volatility is never bigger than in a CDA.
More fundamentally from a practical point of view, the trimming of
the volatility is ampliﬁed by a factor of 5 or more on the whole sample
(see the “All b’s” parts). Virtually all subsamples show that a size-
able reduction is possible imposing low levels of taxation (tax = 1,2
roughly equivalent to 0.1-0.2% proportional taxation rate) that are re-
cently hypothesized in the debate on this topic. The right panel of
Figure 1 shows the reduction of volatility when N = 2000, for diﬀerent
values of b.
As far as volume and distortion are concerned, we provide in Appen-
dix B Tables 9 and 8 with full regression results.
Similarly to what observed in a CDA, the volume is strongly aﬀected
in a dealership. Observe that this is providing further support to theEFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 15
observation that reducing the volatility is not tantamount to volume
cutting. Hence, if a TT is visibly decreasing the volume in both CDA’s
and dealerships, some other driver is responsible for the diﬀerent out-
comes in terms of volatility. A ﬁrst, perhaps trivial, explanation lies in
the diﬀerent role taken by the bid-ask spread in the two markets. While
a reduction in the traded volume is likely to widen the bid-ask spread in
a CDA, one of the features of our dealership is that a constant bid-ask
is provided to the dealer at any time. This liquidity provision is not
aﬀected by the number of transactions, given the duty for the dealer
to quote prices with no discontinuity. Second, a careful inspection of
the data shows that smaller volume produce sparse orders’ books in a
CDA. A sequence of marketable limit orders of the same type can then
escalate the book producing wide price changes. These liquidity holes
are, by deﬁnition, missing in a dealership and this results in smoother
price dynamics under reduced volume. Somewhat related comments
on microstructures have been given, for example, in [10], [19] and [18].
The imposition of a tax in a Dealership has again a somewhat weak
(and often null) eﬀect on distortion, see also Figure 2, right panel.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes in dif-
ferent institutional market microstructure settings. Within our model,
asset prices are driven by the orders of the market participants. These
agents rely on technical, fundamental and random trading strategies to
determine their investment positions. However, they are not forced to
trade. The decision to be active or inactive depends on the past prof-
itability of the agent’s trades. Should a trader encounter losses, he/she
may decide to stop trading (and vice versa). In one of our scenarios,
the orders of the market participants enter a continuous double auction
market. In another scenario, the orders of the market participants are
ﬁlled by a specialist. Both settings are, in general, able to mimic some
stylized facts of ﬁnancial markets and thus allow a comparison of the
impact of transaction taxes on the market dynamics.
Our key ﬁndings may be summarized as follows:
• In a continuous double auction market, the imposition of a
transaction has presumably no stabilizing impact on the market
dynamics. We observe that traders retreat from the market if
a levy has to be paid and that thus volume decreases. How-
ever, also liquidity decreases so that on average a given order
obtains a larger price impact. This, in turn, counters or even
eliminates an otherwise stabilizing eﬀect of the transaction tax.
The distortion in the market remains unaltered.
• Our model predicts that in a dealership market a transaction
tax has the power to stabilize market dynamics. Also in this16 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
environment, traders retreat from the market and volume de-
clines. However, since liquidity is exogenously provided by a
specialist the price impact of a given order remains constant
and thus volatility signiﬁcantly declines. Surprisingly, the dis-
tortion is not signiﬁcantly reduced.
Summing up, we ﬁnd that market microstructure details matter for
the eﬀectiveness of transaction taxes. We hope that our paper resolves
some of the confusion frequently observed in the debate on the nature
of transaction taxes.
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Appendix A. Stylized facts
This appendix aims to describe the time series that are analyzed
in the paper corroborating the claim that our model is able, despite
its simplicity, to produce reasonably realistic returns. We show in the
following that the data exhibit some among the common statistical
features of ﬁnancial time-series that are frequently dubbed “stylized
facts”. For brevity, we comment in this Appendix only the simulations
with 1000 agents in a CDA and 2000 in a Dealership.
Figure 3 depicts a representative price trajectory in a CDA, to-
gether with the density of the log-returns. The price visually displays
a random-like behaviour with sudden bursts and crashes. The density
is clearly non-gaussian, leptokurtic and fat-tailed. Formal tests reveals














































Figure 3. Price time series and returns’ density of a
representative CDA simulation (N = 1000,b = 9,tax =
4). The dashed lines show the fundamental value (left)
and a normal distribution with same mean and variance
(right).
that normality can be strongly rejected and lagged returns are indepen-
dent (the Shapiro-Wilk p-value is smaller than 10−20; the Box-Pierce
p-value with 5 lags is 0.60, so that independence cannot be rejected).
This example is somewhat illustrative of the whole sample obtained
when the market is a CDA: normality of returns is (strongly) rejected
for all simulations and the null hypothesis of linear independence of
returns is rejected at the 1% conﬁdence level by Box-Pierce test in 8
cases out of 100.
The simulated returns in CDA show a fair amount of excess kurtosis
(with respect to the gaussian value µ4 = 3), see the upper part of Table
7.EFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 19
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for the kurtosis (normal-
ized central fourth moment) of returns in a CDA and in
a Dealership.
Min. 1Qu. Median Mean 3Qu. Max.
CDA (N = 1000) 3.910 4.450 4.743 4.855 5.178 7.334
Dea (N = 2000) 2.574 2.897 3.022 3.059 3.121 4.564
The time series obtained in a Dealership are slightly less satisfactory
in that returns are closer to normality and there is a weak degree of
linear predictability in some cases. The observation that some market
mechanisms (like the CDA) may make the presence of stylized facts
more likely is not new, see [24] and [23]. Figure 4 shows a representative
example of price and returns’ density. The price is ﬂuctuating quite
realistically, with pronounced deviations from the fundamental. The
hypothesis of normal distribution of returns cannot be rejected (the p-
value is 0.075) conﬁrming the visual proximity of the densities displayed
on the right part of Figure 4. Examining the whole sample, normality























































Figure 4. Price time series and returns’ density of
a typical simulation in a Dealership (N = 2000,b =
9,tax = 4). The dashed lines show the fundamental
value (left) and a normal distribution with same mean
and variance (right).
is rejected at the 5% conﬁdence level by a Shapiro-Wilk in 54 cases out
of 100. As seen in the lower part of Table 7, there is little evidence of
excess kurtosis when the market platform is a Dealership.
The independence of returns is not rejected (at the 1% level) for 78
simulations. In the 22 cases where some linear structure is present in
the returns, the strength of predictability is extremely low. Figure 5
depicts, for every simulation, the autocorrelation with biggest modulus
(35 lags are considered).20 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK























































Figure 5. Autocorrelation with biggest absolute value,
for each of the 100 simulations of a Dealership with N =
2000 agents.
On the one hand, the absolute magnitude of the autocorrelation is
rarely exceeding 0.05: this predictability is statistically signiﬁcant, at
times but is rather low to provide trading gains. On the other hand, the
prevalence of negative signs in the picture is suggesting that this weak
autocorrelation might be due to the bid-ask bounce possibly occurring
in a Dealership.EFFECTS OF TRANSACTION TAXES 21
Appendix B. Dealership’s data
This appendix shows the regression results for the volume (Table 8)
and the distortion (Table 9) in a Dealership market.
Table 8. Volume in a Dealership (units traded). The
estimates are relative to diﬀerent numbers of agents N
(Panels A to E) and subsamples (low, medium, high,
all b’s). Entries are in boldface (italic) if statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) conﬁdence level.
Panel A: N = 1000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 7.63 ( 5.80 ) 12.02( 9.02 ) 14.55( 5.98 ) 9.79 (18.40)
α -2.85 ( -8.37 ) -0.82( -3.42 ) -0.92( -5.40 ) -1.36( -8.02 )
b 2.76 ( 4.03 ) 0.12 ( 0.48 ) -0.07 ( -0.27 ) 0.59 ( 7.96 )
Panel B: N = 2000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 9.06 ( 9.34 ) 17.75( 7.20 ) 23.06( 4.15 ) 14.53(14.43)
α -3.72 (-16.07) -2.64( -7.48 ) -1.01( -2.87 ) -2.69( -9.65 )
b 5.26 (14.85) 1.64 ( 3.80 ) 0.31 ( 0.51 ) 1.86 (13.70)
Panel C: N = 4000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 11.85 ( 4.07 ) 34.14(15.99) 43.55( 9.00 ) 27.59(18.84)
α -6.34 (-11.01) -4.59(-15.52) -3.87(-12.27) -4.84(-12.83)
b 10.94 ( 8.01 ) 2.63 ( 6.91 ) 0.94 ( 1.74 ) 3.33 (15.92)
Panel D: N = 500
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 5.79 ( 8.62 ) 6.19 ( 5.73 ) 3.68 ( 1.40 ) 6.84 (20.52)
α -1.22 ( -8.18 ) -0.64( -4.24 ) -0.57( -3.89 ) -0.80( -8.31 )
b 0.92 ( 3.20 ) 0.35 ( 1.71 ) 0.42 ( 1.48 ) 0.18 ( 3.77 )
Panel E: N = 250
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k1 4.68 ( 7.45 ) 3.31 ( 5.94 ) 1.07 ( 0.72 ) 4.37 (17.43)
α -1.21 ( -6.48 ) -0.54( -6.94 ) -0.09 ( -0.88 ) -0.49( -6.67 )
b 0.60 ( 2.16 ) 0.26 ( 2.66 ) 0.32 ( 2.03 ) 0.07 ( 1.90 )22 PELLIZZARI PAOLO AND WESTERHOFF FRANK
Table 9. Distortion in a Dealership (%). The estimates
are relative to diﬀerent numbers of agents N (Panels A to
E) and subsamples (low, medium, high, all b’s). Entries
are in boldface (italic) if statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% (5%) conﬁdence level.
Panel A: N = 1000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 5.56 ( 3.85 ) 5.81 ( 3.09 ) 8.52 ( 1.62 ) 7.41 (11.02)
α -0.50 ( -1.34 ) -0.20 ( -0.58 ) -0.51 ( -1.40 ) -0.42 ( -1.96 )
b 1.553 (2.067) 0.357(1.019) 0.077(0.129) 0.175(1.868)
Panel B: N = 2000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 7.49 ( 9.23 ) 5.81 ( 6.55 ) 4.22 ( 1.23 ) 6.28 (16.47)
α 0.201 (1.036) -0.242(-1.903) 0.110(0.507) 0.033(0.311)
b -0.738 (-2.493) 0.122(0.787) 0.232(0.614) -0.008(-0.145)
Panel C: N = 4000
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 6.60 ( 7.57 ) 5.11 ( 7.84 ) 5.38 ( 4.56 ) 5.26 (20.96)
α 0.09 ( 0.52 ) -0.14 ( -1.59 ) -0.34( -4.49 ) -0.16 ( -2.43 )
b -0.938 (-2.292) 0.055(0.475) 0.066(0.499) 0.033(0.920)
Panel D: N = 500
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 9.43 ( 4.31 ) 8.68 ( 3.84 ) 17.39( 1.40 ) 9.38 ( 9.93 )
α -0.163 (-0.334) -0.179(-0.567) 0.269(0.390) -0.046(-0.169)
b 0.028 (0.030) 0.209(0.493) -0.948(-0.706) 0.001(0.005)
Panel E: N = 250
1 ≤ b ≤ 3 4 ≤ b ≤ 7 8 ≤ b ≤ 10 All b’s
k3 14.13 ( 4.60 ) 20.30( 3.28 ) 5.21 ( 1.39 ) 14.90(10.19)
α -1.62 ( -1.78 ) -0.79 ( -0.91 ) -0.36 ( -1.45 ) -0.86 ( -2.02 )
b 0.24 ( 0.17 ) -1.22 ( -1.13 ) 0.48 ( 1.20 ) -0.40 ( -1.99 )
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